CITY LOS ANGELES MAYOR AND COUNCIL
President NURY MARTINEZ, Sixth District . GILBERT A. CEDILLO, First District , PAUL KREKORIAN, Second District; BOB BLUMENFIELD, Third District; NITHYA RAMAN, Fourth District; PAUL KORETZ, Fifth District; MONICA RODRIGUEZ, Seventh District; MARQUEECE HARRIS-DAWSON, Eighth District; CURREN D. PRICE, JR., Ninth District ;MARK RIDLEY-THOMAS, Tenth District; MIKE BONIN, Eleventh District; JOHN S. LEE, Twelfth District ; MITCH O’FARRELL, Thirteenth District; KEVIN DE LEÓN, Fourteenth District, President Pro Tempore JOE BUSCAINO, Fifteenth District. City attorney Mike Feuer.
“Attention City Clerk: I understand in September 2020 the city mandated diversity training for all Neighborhood Councils. Does your office have any information on why NC’s discriminated against me as a candidate in the March 2020 CD10 District election and why no one has contacted me as to a resolution and why the city attorney’s office has not responded? I was physically assaulted by Church security guards and intimidated by event co- sponsors. (Unruh Act, CC section 51). On another note, I believe city employees Marcel Nicolas and Luis Tolentino should be fired for their racial discrimination and retaliation against me after I made valid code violation complaints re 1522 Hi Point St 90035, as reported to the Mayor and Council. Please provide a list of which city employees have been determined to be racist or retaliatory against Blacks who make housing complaints. Please provide a list of any and all city code violation inspectors who are racist. Please see the 36 page documents that was forwarded (June 7, 2021) to the City clerk for file number 14-0268-S13 as they relate to the relationship between harassment by landlords and the politics of exclusion by city funded NC’s (some of them are landlords). G. Juan Johnson, candidate for Mayor of Los Angeles 2022.”
Subject: REBUTTAL CONSIDERATION Johnson / League Of Women Voters of Los Angeles – DFEH Case No.: 202004-09810703
From: G Johnson (email redacted)
To: robin.blackwell@dfeh.ca.gov
Date: Sunday, May 23, 2021, 02:01 PM PDT
To: Robin Blackwell | DFEH Consultant III
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing
2218 Kausen Drive | Suite 100 | Elk Grove | California | 95758 Phone: (916) 582-6908
Email: Robin.Blackwell@dfeh.ca.gov
This shall follow up on our call today. You said I could provide additional info which I do below based on what we discussed today.
(1) FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW DO NOT ALLOW THE RESPONDENT LWV TO SEPARATE “CANDIDATES” FROM “WRITE-IN CANDIDATES” AS THE LWV ALLEGES IT HAS DONE FOR 100 YEARS
Section 73.1940 [47 CFR §73.1940]
Legally qualified candidates for public office
(a) A legally qualified candidate for public office is any person who:
(1) Has publicly announced his or her intention to run for nomination or office;
(2) Is qualified under the applicable local, State or Federal law to hold the office for which he or she is a candidate; and (3) Has met the qualifications set forth in either paragraph (b), (c), (d), or (e) of this section.
(b) A person seeking election to any public office including that of President or Vice President of the United States, or nomination for any public office except that of President or Vice President, by means of a primary, general or special election, shall be considered a legally qualified candidate if, in addition to meeting the criteria set forth in paragraph (a) of this section, that person: (1) Has qualified for a place on the ballot; or
(2) Has publicly committed himself or herself to seeking election by the write-in method and is eligible under applicable law to be voted for by sticker, by writing in his or her name on the ballot or by other method, and makes a substantial showing that he or she is a bona de candidate for nomination or office
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Title 47 United States Code)
“A legally qualified candidate for public office is any person who….
Has publicly committed himself or herself to seeking election by the write-in method and is eligible under applicable law to be voted for by sticker, by writing in his or her name on the ballot or by other method” 47 CFR §73.1940
“Discrimination between candidates. In making time available to candidates for public office, no licensee shall make any discrimination between candidates in practices, regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with the service rendered pursuant to this part, or make or give any preference to any candidate for public office or subject any such candidate to any prejudice or disadvantage; nor shall any licensee make any contract or other agreement which shall have the effect of permitting any legally qualified candidate for any public office to broadcast to the exclusion of other legally qualified candidates for the same public office.” Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Title 47 United States Code)
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE – GOV
TITLE 9. POLITICAL REFORM [81000 – 91014] ( Title 9 added June 4, 1974, by initiative Proposition 9. )
CHAPTER 2. Definitions [82000 – 82054]
( Chapter 2 added June 4, 1974, by initiative Proposition 9. )
82007.
(a) “Candidate” means any of the following:
(1) Anyone who is listed on a ballot or is qualified to have write-in votes cast on their behalf counted by elections officials for nomination or election to any elective office.
(2) Anyone who receives a contribution, makes an expenditure or gives their consent for another person to receive a contribution or make an expenditure, to bring about the person’s nomination or election to an elective office, even if any of the following apply: (A) The specific elective office for which the person will seek nomination or election is unknown at the time the contribution is received or the expenditure is made. (B) The person has not announced the candidacy or filed a declaration of candidacy.
(3) An elected officer, including any elected official who is the subject of a recall.
(b) Anyone who becomes a candidate retains candidate status until that status is terminated under Section 84214. (c) “Candidate” does not include any candidate, as defined in Section 30101(2) of Title 52 of the United States Code, for federal office, as to the person’s activities related to seeking nomination or election to that federal office.
Thus, it is my position that the LWV, by including bot not limited to California GC 82007, if they called their event a CANDIDATE FORUM, as they did, then I was a Candidate, and should have been allowed participation with all other candidates. Anything less is a violation of the Unruh act by the LWV.
(2) IRS Regulations do not allow the LWV to co-sponsor an event with Holman church that violates IRS regulations
Political Campaign Activity (IRS publication “Tax Guide for Churches”)
Under the Internal Revenue Code, all IRC Section 501(c)(3) organizations, including churches and religious organizations, are absolutely prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for elective public office. …On the other hand, voter education or registration activities with evidence of bias that: (a) would favor one candidate over another; (b) oppose a candidate in some manner, or (c) have the effect of favoring a candidate or group of candidates, will constitute prohibited participation or intervention.
Thus, it is my position that the LWV, by including bot not limited to California GC 82007, if they called their event a CANDIDATE FORUM, as they did, then I was a Candidate, and should have been allowed participation with all other candidates. Anything less is a violation of the Unruh act by the LWV. The LWV admitted the event was co-sponsored with the Church, a church that favored candidates over write-in candidates, and admitted the bias of the LWV under IRS regulations, and bias and arbitrary treatment prohibited under Unruh.
(3) ARBITRARY TREATMENT PERSONAL BELIEFS. ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED
The Act’s “fundamental purpose” is “to secure to all persons equal access to public accommodations ‘no matter’ ” their personal characteristics. (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1169.) To accomplish this purpose, the Act prohibits “arbitrary discrimination by business establishments.” (In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 216 (Cox); Sargoy, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1043 [the Act renders unlawful “arbitrary, invidious or unreasonable discrimination”].)
The statute expressly provides that it does not apply to facially neutral policies: “This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person … that is applicable alike to persons” regardless of sex, sexual orientation, medical condition, and other classes. (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (c) [emphasis added].) Thus, “[a] policy that is neutral on its face is not actionable under the Unruh Act, even when it has a disproportionate impact on a protected class.” (Turner, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1408 [emphasis added].)
The practice of the LWV allowing certain Candidates to participate, intentional as they have admitted, is not applicable alike to persons “regardless of” the enumerated and non- enumerated classes. Their benefit was not applicable to me. Therefore the practice of excluding myself from the benefits of the candidate forum violated Unruh.
WRITE-IN CANDIDATE IS SPECIFIED IN ATTACHMENTS TO THE COMPLAINT- ENTITLED “Complaint of Discrimination Under the Provisions of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act RE UNRUH and Governor Gavin Newsom – DATED AND SIGNED APRIL 2, 2020. Received by the DFEH
The phrase “write-in candidate” is mentioned eight times.
(4) The Unruh Act Bars Intentional Discrimination
The central principle of the Unruh Act is a prohibition of intentional discrimination based on certain characteristics. The California Supreme Court has explained: “the language and history of the Unruh Act indicate that the legislative object was to prohibit intentional discrimination …. [A] plaintiff must … plead and prove a case of intentional discrimination to recover under the Act.”
(Harris, 52 Cal.3d at 1149 [rejecting Unruh claim on demurrer; italics in original, bold added].)22 The statute requires an allegation that a defendant adopted or applied its policy for the purpose of accomplishing discrimination or as a disguised device to accomplish discrimination. (Koebke, 36 Cal.4th at 854.. https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19- 1135/141465/20200413114040349_Dignity%20Health%20Brief.pdf
April 2, 2020, signed complaint- p. 8 – Exhibit:
“The actions stated herein were done with malice, with the intent to cause harm to the Claimant. This is a claim/complaint for continuing damages. “ (G. Johnson)
Thus, disparate impact or disparate treatment is not necessary to prove a violation of the Unruh Act. The LWV says it has intentionally excluded candidates who are write-in candidates for over 100 years.
(5) The Unruh Act Prohibits Unequal Treatment and Bias due to personal beliefs
“The Act applies not merely in situations where businesses exclude individuals altogether, but also “where unequal treatment is the result of a business practice.” (Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24, 29 (Koire).) “Unequal treatment includes offering price discounts on an arbitrary basis to certain classes of individuals.” (Pizarro, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1174; Koire, at p. 29.)” (Source: Google Tinder case)
The Unruh Act protects “personal beliefs” and traits fundamental to a person’s identity; this is actionable under Unruh as prohibited discrimination.
Nevertheless, the enumerated categories, bearing the “common element” of being “personal” characteristics of an individual, necessarily confine the Act’s reach to forms of discrimination based on characteristics similar to the statutory classifications—such as “a person’s geographical origin, physical attributes, and personal beliefs.” (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1160.)
The “personal characteristics” protected by the Act are not defined by “immutability, since some are, while others are not [immutable], but that they represent traits, conditions, decisions, or choices fundamental to a person’s identity, beliefs and self- definition.” (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 842–843 (Koebke).)
In this instant case, the evidence shows that it was my personal belief that I was a legally qualified write-in candidate that should be associated with other legally qualified Black candidates and other legally qualified candidates who received full and equal treatment and privileges. The evidence shows that the Respondent used “write-in candidate” as its proffered reason for denying me full and equal accommodations; this is further proof that the Respondent violated the Unruh Act by denying me full and equal accommodations because of my personal beliefs. The complaint indicates it was my belief that I was a qualified candidate.
Did respondent LWV deny, aid, incite, discriminate, or make the distinction that denied full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services to the CLAIMANT?
Yes.
Were the actions of the respondent LWV intentional?
Yes. Without LWV’s participation, the discrimination against the claimant would not have occurred at that location.
(6) Is it proven that a substantial motivating reason for the defendant’s conduct was the defendant’s perception of the plaintiff’s protected basis under the Unruh Act; or that the protected basis of a person whom the plaintiff was associated with was a substantial motivating reason for the defendant’s conduct?
Yes. The LWV response, in concert, that claimant was not a qualified candidate, was pretextual. The real reason the claimant was excluded was due to his race, Black, color medium, sex male, and age 66. Circumstantial evidence. The LWV had actual and constructive knowledge in advance of January 12, 2020, that claimant was African American Black, male, aged 66, and color medium. On January 12, 2020, the claimant appeared at the LWV location and by appearance revealed his protected status to the respondent. The claimant announced numerous times to the ORGANIZERS and others in attendance on January 12, 2020, that he was a qualified candidate and would like to speak on the podium but such full and equal opportunity was repeatedly denied by those in charge. LWV had admitted by its conduct that its motivating reason for its conduct was the claimant’s association with other Black, male, female, Asian, and Latinos persons who were candidates. (Associated with others in protected classes.)
Had the claimant attempted to contract for services and afford himself of the full benefits and enjoyment of public accommodation?
Yes.
Has it been proven that a certified “write-in” candidate was a legally qualified candidate?
Yes.
Was there circumstantial evidence that the LWV denied claimant association with other Blacks at the candidate forum?
Yes.
Has the claimant proven the acts of the respondent were intentional (planned in advance, not accidental) to discriminate against the claimant?
Yes.
Was the respondent practice of providing full and equal accommodations, up to and including the January 12, 2020 candidate publicity and forum, applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, sex, or religion, etc?
No.
6/23/2020 “Protected Class” and the 6th Circuit – Labor and Employment Law Blog – Labor and Employment Law
“The court indicated it did not have to review whether summary judgment was appropriate on plaintiff’s direct evidence claim because it found plaintiff had presented circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case and rebutted the nondiscriminatory reason offered by the defendant. The court stated that it was clear the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside of her racial class. With respect to the sex discrimination claim, the court noted that it could not be “untangled” from her race discrimination claim. The two characteristics do not exist in isolation. The court stated, “African American women are subjected to unique stereotypes that neither African American men nor white women must endure. (citation omitted) And Title VII does not permit plaintiffs to fall between two stools when their claim rests on multiple protected grounds” The court went on to state that if a female African American plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a defendant cannot undermine it by showing that white women and African American men received the same treatment. The court stated, “The realities of the workplace, let alone Title VII, will not allow such an artificial approach.” http://www.michbar.org/file/opinions/us_appeals/2014/021914/56493.pdf
(7) The DFEH feels the word “write-in candidate” is not enumerated in the Complaint. The attachment to the Complaint (signed and dated April 2, 2020) used the phrase eight times. According to state GC section 82007, the phrase “candidate” includes those “qualified” to receive write-in votes. The word “candidate”(s) appears four times in the Aug. 4, 2020, signed complaint.
All rights reserved.
Geary J. Johnson
Claimant
(mobile phone redacted)
To Holly L. Wolcott, City Clerk
City attorney Mike Feuer
(June 18, 2021)
City CPRA Request #21-4918
LA Rent Control (RAC) and Permits (LADBS) 